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  Robert Crandall and Clifford Winston set out to review and enlarge the body of 
scholarly evidence on the effect of antitrust policy on consumer prices.  They ignore, 
however, the great weight of evidence supporting the two core elements of antitrust 
policy—criminal prosecution of cartel activity and challenging anticompetitive 
horizontal mergers.  And their original empirical analysis relating to merger 
enforcement suffers from such serious methodological flaws that it sheds no new 





















Evidence on the Price Effects of Cartels and Mergers 
  Crandall and Winston (2003) cite a single study of the price effects of criminally 
prosecuted cartel activity.  For 25 Department of Justice cases criminal filed during 
1973–83, Sproul (1993) compared a price series including the cartelized market to a 
similar price series for “related products” generally from the BLS producer price 
index.
1  He found that the former series rose more on average than the latter over the 
four years following indictments.  Price changes following indictments, however, are 
not indicative of the price elevating effects of most cartels, because many are 
investigated only after they break down and even more break down when they learn 
they are targets of criminal investigations.  Moreover, Sproul’s data are unsuitable to 
the task because the price series including the cartelized market typically included so 
much more that the effect of the cartel was easily lost; indeed, BLS sampling 
techniques might have totally missed the cartelized product. 
  Crandall and Winston mention none of the other studies of the price effects of 
criminally prosecuted cartel activity.
2  Many relate to bid rigging in government 
procurement, and several examined school milk.  Porter and Zona (1999) found that a 
conspiracy in Ohio increased prices as much as 11.3% in a given year and an average 
of 6.5% over its life span.  Pesendorfer (2000) found that conspiracies in Florida and 
Texas produced winning bids that were statistically significantly higher than non-
collusive bids.  Lee (1999) reported that prices in Dallas–Fort Worth, where bids 
                                                 
 
1Although Sproul stated that the cases involved price fixing and indictments, three 
(Blue Book 2658, 2733, and 2870) were civil cases not involving cartel activity.  Related 
products might be produced from the same basic inputs (e.g., as copper tube is related to 
copper wire); potential substitutes (e.g., as nails are related to screws); the same product in 
different geographic area (e.g., as gasoline nationally is related to gasoline locally); or 
without any direct relationship (e.g., as “all commodities” are related to dyes). 
 
2The studies reviewed here examine criminally prosecuted cartels in existence after 
enactment of the felony provisions of the Sherman Act in late 1974.  The price effects of 
cartels at earlier times may have been substantially different because sanctions were less 
severe.  Studies prepared by experts in treble damage actions constitute a substantial portion 
of this literature.  While those experts were not neutral observers, the peer review process 
for publication should have screened out studies not up to professional standards.  
 
were rigged, were 18% higher than in San Antonio, where they were not, while costs 
in Dallas–Fort Worth were only about 2% higher.  Lanzillotti (1996) reported price 
decreases in Florida when the state began its investigation of a magnitude suggesting 
the cartel increased prices 14–21%. 
  Studies of the effects of bid rigging in construction have compared winning bids 
to pre-sale engineering estimates across auctions with and without rigged bids.   
Howard and Kaserman (1989) found average price increases from bid rigging on 
sewer construction projects of at least 36%.  Studies focusing on highway 
construction have suggested smaller price effects.  In the most comprehensive 
analysis, Brannman and Klein (1992) found bid rigging in North Carolina raised 
prices 18% and bid rigging in South Dakota raised prices 6.5%. 
  Froeb, Koyak, and Werden (1993) found that prices were increased 23–30% by 
bid rigging in Defense Department auctions procuring frozen fish.  Two studies 
examined auctions in which competing buyers conspired to lower purchase prices.  
Nelson (1993) found a 17–28% price decrease from bid rigging in auctions for used 
police cars.  Kwoka (1997) found a 32% price decrease in real estate auctions. 
  Although the literature on the effects of price fixing is sparse, there are studies of 
recent international cartels.  Connor (1997, 2001a, 2001b) extensively examined the 
lysine cartel, and his most recent and reliable estimate (Connor, 2001a) is that it 
increased prices 17%.  Morse and Hyde (2000) found the lysine conspiracy increased 
prices 34%.  Connor (2001a) estimated a 11–24% price increase from the citric acid 
cartel and average price increases of 25–28% from the vitamins cartel. 
  Crandall and Winston mention some empirical evidence on the effects of 
horizontal mergers but are highly selective.  They cite a study indicating that the 
TWA-Ozark and Northwest-Republic mergers lowered fares, but they neglect to 
mention the raft of contrary studies: Borenstein (1990), Kim and Singal (1993), 
Peters (2003), U.S. General Accounting Office (1988), and Werden, Joskow, and 
Johnson (1991). 
Crandall and Winston’s New Empirical Evidence on Mergers 
  Crandall and Winston offer some empirical evidence of their own, relating 
Census price-cost margins (PCMs) to merger consent decrees, contested merger  
 
challenges successful in court, and contested challenges unsuccessful in court.  They 
did this by pooling cross section and time series across the 20 2-digit SIC “major 
groups” in manufacturing and across the years 1984–96.
3  This analysis returns to the 
roots of empirical industrial organization:  Second-generation concentration-profit 
studies (notably Collins and Preston, 1968, 1969), related concentration to PCMs 
computed from Census data, across 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries.  Crandall 
and Winston, however, acknowledge none of the problems with such studies (see 
Fisher, 1987; Liebowitz, 1982; Ornstein, 1975) that led first to the use of alternative 
data sources and eventually to the almost total abandonment of both inter-industry 
studies and the use of PCMs as a dependent variable. 
  Crandall and Winston find that: (1) consent decrees have a significant positive 
effect on PCMs; (2) challenges unsuccessful in court have a significant negative 
effect on PCMs; and (3) challenges successful in court have a insignificant negative 
effect on PCMs.  They interpret their findings to “suggest that merger enforcement is 
primarily undermining mergers that enhance efficiency, rather than protecting 
competition.” 
  Although the data do not correspond even very roughly to the relevant markets 
affected by the mergers, it is useful to begin by assuming otherwise, and asking what 
one should expect to find.  In the vast majority of cases, the challenged merger had 
not been consummated, so no significant competitive effects should have occurred as 
of the date the case was filed.  As to the portion of the transactions to which the 
government objected, there was neither a merger nor consequent price effect from a 
                                                 
 
3Some of the description here may be inaccurate because Crandall and Winston leave 
much unclear, and Winston declined to respond to inquiries.  Most likely, each case was 
dated based on its filing, but dates of decision may have been used, and it is possible that 
some cases were counted more than once.  Some have two court decisions, and one case that 
may have been included had four.  The merger enforcement variables could be dummy 
variables or counts. 
  Crandall and Winston do not mention industry fixed effects.  With them, the 
coefficients on the merger enforcement variables measure the average change in PCMs 
following enforcement events.  Without them, those coefficients also reflect inter-industry 
differences in PCMs caused by the host omitted variables that inevitably are correlated with 
the level of merger activity.  Evans, Froeb, and Werden (1993) found fixed effects critical in 
intra-industry studies, and they likely are even more important in inter-industry studies.  
 
merger, unless the government both failed in court and the deal went through as 
proposed (and this latter event does not always follow the former).  Whether the 
government was right or wrong in its beliefs about the competitive effects of the 
challenged mergers, no effects on PCMs should be expected from either consent 
decrees or successful court challenges.  The only possible test of the legitimacy of 
merger enforcement comes from the coefficient on unsuccessful challenges. 
  In light of the foregoing, the finding that consent decrees caused PCMs to rise is 
curious.  To the extent the decrees merely prevented a consolidation of assets that the 
government believed to be anticompetitive, the decrees maintained the statue quo 
ante, and hence should have had no effect on PCMs, whether the government was 
right or wrong in its beliefs.  Crandall and Winston’s contrary finding could have 
arisen, however, if negotiated remedies were inadequate, either because they allowed 
price-increasing consolidations of assets, or because they failed to preserve the 
competitive viability of divested assets.  In either case, the implication is that 
enforcement should be more rigorous.  It is also possible that costs rose because the 
mergers were inefficient. 
  Crandall and Winston’s finding that unsuccessful merger challenges caused 
PCMs to fall insignificantly is interesting.  Assuming this finding implies that the 
government was wrong in its beliefs that these mergers were anticompetitive, it also 
implies that the system worked reasonably well:  Mergers that were not 
anticompetitive were allowed to proceed, generally without much delay. 
  The most telling problem with the Crandall and Winston analysis is that the 
effects of merger enforcement cannot be detected in such highly aggregated data.  
They take the view that aggregation cannot be a fatal flaw in their analysis because it 
only dilutes the effects being measured.  But they fail to grasp either the potential or 
actual extent of the dilution.  Suppose the government correctly forecast that a 
merger would cause a 5% increase in industry average prices (roughly consistent 
with effects the federal agencies predict).  If the pre-merger PCM for the relevant 
market was 0.25 (the average figure reported by Collins and Preston (1968)), the 
post-merger PCM would be 0.286.  But if the relevant market constituted just 1% of 
an industry aggregate in which all firms had PCMs of 0.25, the predicted post-merger 
PCM would be 0.2504, and the increase would be lost in the noise of unexplained 
variation in the PCMs of the remaining 99%.  Thus, it is essential to ask how the  
 
volume of commerce in the alleged relevant markets compares with that of the SIC 2-
digit major groups used by Crandall and Winston. 
  For the Department of Justice’s merger cases brought during the 7 years 
following the release of the 1982 Merger Guidelines (a period substantially 
overlapping that of the Crandall and Winston study), Pittman and Werden (1990) 
calculated “Commerce Quotients”—the ratio of the annual dollar volume of 
commerce in the alleged relevant market to the value of shipments for the 
corresponding 4-digit SIC industry.  They found that the Commerce Quotients were 
less than 0.25 for 77.8% of the alleged relevant markets and less than 0.01 for 32.5% 
of the markets.  Roughly translating to 2-digit major groups is straightforward 
because the 20 SIC major groups in manufacturing encompass about 400 SIC 
industries.  The 2-digit Commerce Quotients, thus, would be less than about 0.01 for 
roughly 3/4 of the markets and less than about 0.0005 for roughly a 1/3 of the 
markets.  Thus, the Crandall and Winston data are far too aggregated to permit the 
measurement of any effects of merger enforcement.
4 
  There is a need for additional empirical evidence on the price effects of 
criminally prosecuted cartels and horizontal mergers, but Crandall and Winston do 






                                                 
 
4Crandall and Winston criticize federal enforcers for not targeting industries with high 
PCMs, but the PCMs on which Crandall and Winston focus are not the relevant PCMs.  
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